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MORELLI v. CEDEL:  IGNORING JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS AND
OUTFLANKING CONGRESS TOWARDS THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE ADEA
Matthew H. Hawes* and W. Scott Hardy**
I.  INTRODUCTION
Throughout the Twentieth Century, legislatures at all levels of American
government have sought admirably to protect workers from a host of
economic and societal ills by enacting broad-based remedial legislation.  At
times, these same legislatures have abdicated responsibility to the executive
bureaucracy for further regulatory development.  Without ensuring the
attendant transfer of political accountability commensurate with the authority
of the regulatory state, the delicate balance of powers crafted by the founders
becomes skewed.  Armed with the combined might of legislative fiat and
unfettered enforcement power, the heavy hand of an over-zealous executive
bureaucracy extends itself beyond the bounds initially established by the
legislature in what is known as “mission creep.”  And, in the modern
economy, the ramifications of mission creep are global.
Foreign businesses seeking to explore American markets through small
American enterprises must remain wary of being caught in the morass of
statutory and regulatory dictates that pervade American labor and employment
legislation.  As with their American counterparts, many of these small foreign
businesses have neither the sophistication to understand the complexities of
the American regulatory state nor the abundant resources necessary for
compliance.  Compounded by capricious statutory interpretations, their
willingness to “invest in America” is diminished with the knowledge that they
may be required to appease the regulatory community—and the Equal
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1. It is certainly Congress’s prerogative to enact legislation that protects employees working on
American soil or otherwise favors American employers vis-à-vis foreign employers insofar as such
legislation stays within the bounds of the U.S. Constitution, international law, and comity.  The propriety
or efficacy of such policies are far beyond the scope of this narrow exposition, and, accordingly, the authors
offer no opinion in this regard.
2. Between 2001 and 2002, new foreign investment dropped by more than half to just $52.6
billion—a level not seen for nearly a decade and an 84% drop from a high of $335.6 billion in 2000.  News
Release, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Foreign Direct Investors’ Outlays to Acquire or Establish U.S.
Businesses Fell Sharply in 2002 for the Second Year (June 2, 2003), available at http://www.bea.doc.
gov/bea/newsrel/fdi02.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2004) (illustrating that 2002 witnessed a precipitous
decline in new foreign investment in the United States).  These statistics are from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA), U.S. Department of Commerce.  The BEA studies the U.S. economy through statistical
analyses with the goal of aiding policy makers in their decision-making processes.  See Bureau of Economic
Analysis, Mission Statement, available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/about/mission.htm (last visited
Jan. 17, 2004).  The BEA does not expressly suggest that the U.S. regulatory state was the sole, or even a
major factor in this decline.  The BEA reports that the decline was due to “continuing weakness in the U.S.
economy and in many foreign economies . . . .”  Id.  Businesses and investors dislike any uncertainty or
unpredictability caused by the U.S. regulatory state and consider those factors in their business’s expansion
or new investment decisions.
3. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)).
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in particular—when their
equally small American counterparts are not required to do so.1  In such an
anti-competitive environment, some foreign investors may conclude it is not
worth the effort.2
Nearly forty years after the initial passage of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),3 most of the world remains unsure as to
the full scope of the statute’s jurisdictional reach.  Such uncertainty, when
confronted by small foreign businesses seeking their fortunes in America, can
manifest itself in the calculus of counting employees, i.e., whether non-United
States citizens working for non-United States companies on non-United States
soil are to be counted for purposes of determining whether the ADEA’s
coverage extends over an affiliated American entity employing a small
complement of workers (less than twenty), on American soil.  When such
uncertainty exists, the simple matter of counting employees becomes a
jurisdictional matter of international scope.
Political leaders of all ideologies regularly seek to attract foreign
companies to invest in their communities, to employ their constituents, and to
contribute to their tax bases.  Yet these efforts are silently thwarted, in part,
by significant, albeit incalculable, costs associated with the well-intentioned
efforts of foreign (as well as domestic) businesses endeavoring to comply with
the demands of the American regulatory state.  The question ultimately
becomes whether Congress intended to extend coverage of the ADEA to
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4. It is noteworthy, although in no way limiting the authority of the decision, that the opinion was
authored by a visiting judge, Circuit Judge Cudahy of the Seventh Circuit, and joined by a senior judge,
Senior Judge Newman.  The panel consisted of only one full-time judge from the Second Circuit, Judge
Calabresi.
5. Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1998).
6. See Angela Broughton et al., International Employment, 33 INT’L LAW. 291, 314 (1999)
(discussing Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken, 26 F. Supp. 2d 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), and the impact
of Morelli v. Cedel on employment anti-discrimination law).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
8. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the floor debate of
the ADEA’s older statutory cousin, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), during which the
minimum employee requirement was discussed as a provision to protect small businesses from the burdens
of compliance and the costs of litigation associated with discrimination suits).
foreign entities or their foreign employees, and, by extension, whether
Congress intended for the EEOC to extend its presence internationally.
The actual text of the ADEA and Congress’s underlying intent is quite
clear.  Yet, at least one court—the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit—has ignored both the text of the statute and the intent of
Congress by overextending coverage of the ADEA internationally.  Ironically,
however, the court extended coverage of the ADEA in the name of Congress’s
purported intent.  Indeed, the Second Circuit’s4 1998 decision in Morelli v.
Cedel5 effectively rewrote Congress’s definition of “employer” to extend
coverage of the ADEA to small companies otherwise too small to implicate
ADEA coverage but for the sizable foreign operations of a foreign parent
entity.6
Although the Supreme Court has not had an opportunity to interpret the
ADEA under circumstances in which the EEOC or a private litigant seeks to
extend the ADEA’s coverage to the small American subsidiary (i.e., an
enterprise with fewer than twenty employees) of a foreign business employing
a larger complement of overseas workers, at least one appellate court has had
such an opportunity and other appellate courts soon will too.  It is a matter of
time before this issue percolates towards final disposition by the Supreme
Court.
Enacted in 1967, the ADEA has the stated purpose of “promot[ing]
employment of older persons based upon their ability rather than age . . . .”7
However, the ADEA does not regulate every business or protect every worker.
Rather, Congress sought to regulate a narrower subset of companies and
sought to limit the subset of protected individuals by extending coverage to
the ADEA only to those individuals who are statutorily defined “employees,”
working for what the statute defines as “employers.”8
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9. The ADEA defines a “person” as “one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, labor
organizations, corporations, business trusts, legal representatives, or any organized groups of persons.”  29
U.S.C. § 630(a) (2000).
10. “‘[I]ndustry affecting commerce’ means any activity, business, or industry in commerce or in
which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce . . . .”  29 U.S.C.
§ 630(h) (2000).
11. The twenty employee minimum has fluctuated over the years.  Beginning at fifty employees, it
was finally set at its current level through an amendment in 1974.  Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(1), 88 Stat. 74 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)
(2000)).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
13. “The term ‘employee’ means an individual employed by any employer . . . . [including] any
individual who is a citizen of the United States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign
country.”  29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (narrow exception for state or political subdivision omitted).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).  As originally enacted, the ADEA protected only employees between the
ages of forty and seventy years.  However, a 1986 amendment struck the provision relating to the upper age
limit.  Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, §§ 2(c), 6(a), 100
Stat. 3342, 3344 (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1)).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) (“The prohibitions of this section shall not apply where the employer is
a foreign person not controlled by an American employer.”).
16. Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1998).
The ADEA’s jurisdictional constraints are accomplished through two
limitations—one definitional and the other substantive.  The statute defines
an “employer” as a “person9 engaged in an industry affecting commerce10 who
has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty11 or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . .”12
Further, while “employee” is defined quite broadly to include virtually all
workers,13 the ADEA only protects those employees over forty years of age.14
Finally, and more substantive than definitional, the ADEA’s reach is also
limited by geography, citizenship, and the realities of corporate governance
by excluding coverage “where the employer is a foreign person not controlled
by an American employer.”15
Faced with deciding whether a small, seven-employee New York City
“branch” office of a foreign business could meet the jurisdictional minimums
required of the ADEA by counting the foreign business’s foreign workers, the
Morelli court made two important holdings:  (i) that domestic operations of
a foreign corporation not controlled by an American corporation would be
subject to liability under the ADEA; and (ii) that foreign workers are to be
counted towards reaching the statutory minimum when a domestic employer
has fewer than twenty domestic employees.16  By reversing the district court
and finding that “a foreign corporation’s foreign employees are counted for
the purpose of determining whether the corporation has enough employees to
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17. Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
18. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY:  REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL:
USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:  A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION i (1989).
19. DANIEL P. O’MEARA, PROTECTING THE GROWING NUMBER OF OLDER WORKERS:  THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 11 (1989).
be subject to the ADEA,”17 the Second Circuit extended the dictates of the
ADEA (and, consequently, the EEOC’s investigative authority) upon foreign
controlled businesses despite the text of the ADEA and Congress’s contrary
intent.
The focus of this exposition is the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’
flawed reasoning in Morelli v. Cedel.  But rather than merely present a case
note, Morelli is intended to serve as a vehicle for a critique of the judiciary’s
penchant in the employment arena for supplanting its will for that of Congress
and the consequent mission creep expected of the regulatory community.
Joseph Story once stated, “‘whatever may have been the private intentions of
the framers . . . , it is certain, that the true rule of interpretation is to ascertain
the public and just intention from the language of the instrument itself,
according to the common rules applied to all laws.’”18
Part II of this Article discusses the legislative foundations of the ADEA,
including its unremarkable history and known limitations, its narrow
extraterritorial expansion, and the unintended birth of its internationality.  In
Part III, we discuss Morelli v. Cedel, its facts, how the district court correctly
decided the matter, and how the Second Circuit veered off course.  In Part IV,
we provide the anatomy of how the Second Circuit outflanked Congress
towards the internationality of the ADEA.  We then conclude, in Part V, by
identifying the negative geopolitical and economic consequences of judicial
usurpation of congressional authority.
II.  LEGISLATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ADEA
A.  A False Start and a Humble Beginning
The ADEA did not burst upon the employment scene in 1967 without
warning or contemplation.  Rather, the possibility of prohibiting age
discrimination in employment surfaced in the debates over the passage of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).  The opponents of Title VII
sought inclusion of an age provision in the broader bans on sex, race, and
national origin discrimination that Congress eventually enacted.19  Mostly
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20. Id. at 12.
21. See id. at 12 n.26 and accompanying text.
22. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265 (1964).
23. O’MEARA, supra note 19, at 13 (discussing the Secretary of Labor’s report THE OLDER
AMERICAN WORKER:  AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT).
24. Id.
25. Id.  As O’Meara discusses, one study, upon which the report relied, “showed that approximately
one-half of all job openings which developed in the private economy each year were closed to applicants
over fifty-five . . . and a quarter of these job openings were closed to applicants over forty-five.”  Id. (citing
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER:  AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 1, 6
(1965), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 16,
23 (1981)).
26. H.R. REP. NO. 90-805 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2214 (quoting U.S. DEP’T
OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER:  AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1965)).
27. O’MEARA, supra note 19, at 13-14.  Provisions to prohibit age discrimination had actually gone
so far as to be added to the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38 (1963), before deletion while the bill
was still in committee.  Id.
28. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 606, 80 Stat. 845 (1966).
Southerners, the bill’s opponents had hoped that Title VII would become “so
broad and ‘unreasonable’ as to keep it from passing.”20
Seeking to forestall the opposition, Title VII’s proponents asserted that
not enough was known about the problems of age discrimination to effectively
legislate a remedy,21 and succeeded in adding a provision directing the
Secretary of Labor to engage in a study of the problems of workplace age
discrimination.22
Delivered to Congress in 1965, the Secretary’s report, entitled The Older
American Worker:  Age Discrimination in Employment, concluded that the
problem of age discrimination was not prejudice but rather incorrect
stereotypes in hiring.23  A particular focus was the practice of employers
setting age limits beyond which candidates would no longer be considered for
open positions.24  Such practices, the report found, led to long-term
unemployment of older workers.25  The Secretary of Labor’s recommendation:
“A clear cut and implemented Federal policy . . . [that] would provide a
foundation for a much-needed vigorous, nationwide campaign to promote
hiring without discrimination on the basis of age.”26  Supporters of civil rights
reform achieved a perfect victory.  Not only had they won the passage of Title
VII, but they also succeeded in making age discrimination in the workplace
a matter of national concern.
In 1966, after another stunted attempt to place an age discrimination
provision in other labor legislation,27 Congress ordered the Secretary of Labor
to submit specific legislative recommendations to combat the ills identified in
the report the previous year.28  Finally, three years after the first serious
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29. H.R. REP. NO. 90-805 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2214.
30. See O’MEARA, supra note 19, at 3.
31. Although an imperfect comparison, Title VII covers thirty-five pages of the United States Code.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).  Likewise, the Americans with Disabilities Act spans thirty-two pages.  42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).  This is contrast to the nineteen pages for the ADEA.  29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (2000).
32. See O’MEARA, supra note 19, at 14.
33. See generally id. and accompanying text.
34. O’MEARA, supra note 19, at 14.
35. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, YOUR TIME WILL COME:  LAW OF AGE DISCRIMINATION AND
MANDATORY RETIREMENT 15 (1984).
36. See Letter expressing Supplemental Views of Representatives Thompson of New Jersey,
Holland, Dent, O’Hara of Michigan, Hawkins, Gibbons, Ford of Michigan, Hathaway, Mink, Scheuer, and
Meeds on H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. 1967, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, at 2225
(contending that the most flagrant form of discrimination, that which occurs in the airline industry with
respect to stewardesses, is inadequately addressed by the statute because discrimination begins at an age
far younger than the forty-five years provided in the law).
37. FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 15.  The brevity of the legislative history brought another
commentator to conclude that “[t]he legislative history of the ADEA is a model of lucidity.”  Alfred W.
Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA:  Intent or Impact, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY COUNCIL, AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT:  A COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND
PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 68, 73 (Monte B. Lake ed., 1982).  Brevity may make for a lucid legislative
history, but it can make the interpretive task infinitely more difficult.
38. FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 15.
attempt to address age discrimination in the American workplace, President
Lyndon Johnson recommended passage of the ADEA in his “Older American”
message delivered on January 23, 1967.29  The ADEA was finally enacted on
December 15, 1967.
The ADEA is not, nor has it ever been, an overly long or complex
statute.30  Slightly more than half the length of Title VII or the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA),31 the original 1967 version of the ADEA did not even
receive much attention from the Congress that enacted it.32
Considering the bill’s record and the original intention to use anti-age
discrimination provisions as an impediment to the passage of Title VII,33 it is
rather surprising that opposition to the ADEA was insignificant.34  No one in
the Senate opposed the bill,35 and only eleven Congressmen in the House of
Representatives stood in opposition—all because they believed its protections
were not strong enough.36  The dearth of debate and wrangling led one
commentator to quip:  “The legislative history is exceedingly bland.”37
“Nobody seemed to pay much attention to what was actually in the law.
Without much fanfare, the bill became law.”38  Its quiet passage left one
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39. O’MEARA, supra note 19, at 14 (noting that “it was predicted that fewer than 1,000 charges
would be filed annually”).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2000).
41. The ADEA makes it unlawful, inter alia, for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
Congress further declared that the prohibitions of the ADEA shall be limited to individuals who are at least
forty years of age.  Id. § 631(a).
42. Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92, 93 (8th Cir. 1975).
43. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202 § 12, 81 Stat. 607 (1967)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)).
44. FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 13.  The long-term effect of the ADEA has borne this out.  One
commentator has noted that “the problem at which Congress directed the ADEA, age discrimination in
hiring and long-term unemployment among older workers, is no better and no worse than it was when the
ADEA was passed in 1967.”  O’MEARA, supra note 19, at 2.  Census data, compiled and published in
support of a recent report by the AARP, a not-for-profit membership organization for people fifty years of
age and older clearly strengthens this conclusion.  See AARP, BEYOND 50:  A REPORT TO THE NATION ON
ECONOMIC SECURITY (2001), available at http://www.research.aarp.org/econ/beyond_50_econ.html (last
visited Jan. 17, 2004).  In 1980, only 41% of the population over the age of fifty participated in the
workforce.  Twenty years later, in spite of all the advancements in healthcare, education, and anti-
discrimination laws that number had increased to just 44%.  In fact, after 1980 the number of older workers
participating in the labor force actually dropped as low as 38%.  It was not until 1996 that the numbers
again surpassed the mark set in 1980.  See AARP, BEYOND 50:  SUMMARY TABLES AND CHARTS (2001),
scholar to conclude that “Congress was totally unaware of the impact the
ADEA would ultimately have.”39
B.  The ADEA Knows Its Limits
As is set forth in the Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose,
the ADEA is intended “to promote employment of older persons based on
their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in
employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment.”40  Vague as these phrases are,
the broad statement of legislative purpose might provide the best explanation
of the scope of the law’s intended prohibitions.
In enacting the ADEA, Congress expressed its will to prohibit certain
companies from discriminating against certain individuals.41  Although
described as “remedial and humanitarian,”42 the ADEA was drafted with many
significant limitations; not all “older” workers were protected and not all
employing entities were covered “employers.”
At the outset, the ADEA only protected workers between the ages of forty
and sixty-five.43  Indeed, the ADEA had been described as protective not for
the elderly, but for the middle-aged.44  Congress raised the upper age limit to
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available at http://www.research.aarp.org/econ/beyond_50_econ_tables.html (follow link for
‘Employment’) (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
45. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 12(a), 92
Stat. 189 (1978).
46. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592 § 2(c)(1), 100
Stat. 3342 (1986).
47. 29 U.S.C. § 631(c) (2000) (requiring an aggregate pension of at least $44,000 per year in
benefits for mandatory retirement to be permissible).  The ADEA also provides for an exemption situation
where “age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business.”  Id. § 623(f)(1).  Examples of bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs) include
a mandatory retirement age for airline flight engineers, Iervolino v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 796 F.2d 1408,
1421 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1090 (1987), and maximum ages for new hires to work within
a correctional facility, Stewart v. Smith, 673 F.2d 485, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
48. Section 11(a) of the original text of the ADEA defined the term “person” to mean “one or more
individuals, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, corporations, business trusts, legal
representatives, or any organized groups of persons.”  Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-202 § 11(a), 81 Stat. 602, reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 658, 662 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000)).
49. Section 11(h) of the ADEA defined the term “industry affecting commerce” to mean “any
activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce
or the free flow of commerce and includes any activity or industry ‘affecting commerce’ within the meaning
of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.”  Id. § 11(h), reprinted in 1967
U.S.C.C.A.N. 658, 663-64 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(h) (2000)).
50. Id. § 11(b), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 658, 662 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b) (2000)).
51. Id. § 11(f), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 658, 663 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 630(f)
(2000)).
52. See, e.g., Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the floor debate
of Title VII and suggesting that the minimum employee requirement was intended to protect small
businesses from the burdens of compliance and the costs of litigation associated with discrimination suits).
53. We do not intend to suggest that small business should feel free to discriminate in a manner
seventy in 1978,45 and eventually removed the upper bound age limit
completely for the majority of workers.46  Mandatory retirement, however, is
still permissible for “bona fide executives or high policymakers” older than
sixty-five, so long as certain pension requirements are met.47
Similarly, an ADEA covered “employer” was originally limited to “a
person48 engaged in an industry affecting commerce49 who has twenty-five or
more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . .”50  The term “employee”
was merely defined, albeit circularly, as “an individual employed by any
employer.”51  By adopting these limiting definitions of the terms “employer”
and “employee,” Congress had not only sought to cloak the ADEA in the
constitutionality of the Commerce Clause, but had also sought to insulate
smaller domestic businesses from the expense52 and inconvenience of
compliance.53
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prescribed by the ADEA from a moral or ethical standpoint.  Smaller employers may indeed have a legal
obligation to comply with state statutes and local ordinances very similar to the ADEA.  Rather, we simply
mean that certain smaller business are not subject to the ADEA.
54. 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
55. 745 F.2d 279 (4th Cir. 1984).
56. Id. at 281; Cleary, 728 F.2d at 610.
57. See Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that the
ADEA does not apply to “Americans employed outside the United States by American employers”);
Thomas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 745 F.2d 279, 281 (4th Cir. 1984) (same); Zahourek v. Arthur Young &
Co., 750 F.2d 827, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1984) (same).
58. Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, 1983:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aging
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 98th Cong. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings:  Age
Discrimination and Overseas Americans].
59. 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984).
60. 750 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1984).
61. Hearings:  Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, supra note 58, at 2.
C.  A Narrow Expansion of Extraterritorially Leads to the Unintended
Birth of Internationality
Between 1967 and 1984, the world’s economies seemingly began to meld.
U.S. companies began to explore opportunities overseas, and foreign
enterprises began to invest in and merge with U.S. companies on American
soil.  The economic realities of a global marketplace outpaced the initial
provincial intentions of the ADEA.  Before too long, appellate court decisions
in cases such as Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc.54 and Thomas v. Brown
and Root, Inc.55 found the proscriptions of the ADEA did not extend to the
extraterritorial operations of U.S. businesses.56  Indeed, although courts had
faithfully applied the text of the ADEA, based upon clear statutory language
limiting the statute’s reach to the domestic realm,57 such disciplined refusal to
expand the ADEA without clear legislative authorization did not go unnoticed.
Congress responded swiftly by holding hearings on the issue.  Senator
Charles E. Grassley, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Aging, Committee on
Labor and Human Resources, presided over the hearings on “age
discrimination and overseas Americans” on September 23, 1983.58  The
hearings with the Senator began by expressly referencing the court opinions
in Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc.59 and Zahourek v. Arthur Young & Co.,60
and indicating that the purpose of the hearing was to investigate whether
“further clarification of congressional intent would be helpful in insuring the
protection of thousands of American workers.”61
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62. Id. at 3.
63. Id.
64. See S. REP. NO. 98-467, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 2975.  The 1984
amendments also added a new defense to ADEA liability in the context of employing a U.S. citizen overseas
where compliance with the ADEA would cause the employing entity to violate the laws of the host nation.
See Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-459, § 802(b)(1), 98 Stat. 1767, 1792
(1984) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000)).  Additionally, the 1984 amendments increased from
$27,000 to $44,000 the annual private retirement benefit level necessary for a bona fide executive or high
policymaking position to be exempt from ADEA coverage.  See id. § 802(c)(1), 98 Stat. 1767, 1792
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631(c)(1)).
65. Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, § 802(a) (amending section 11(f) of the ADEA)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2000)).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 623.
Clarence Thomas, then the Chairman of the EEOC, testified that the
ADEA, as then written, “[did] not apply to [Americans working for American
companies abroad] for basically the same reasons set out by the court in
Cleary . . . .  Neither the ADEA nor its legislative history give any indication
that the statute should apply to acts outside this country’s borders.”62  Thomas
further testified:
It can be argued that the ADEA should be amended to provide extraterritorial
coverage to Americans working in foreign countries for American companies.  This is
underscored by [T]itle VII’s extraterritorial application and the long-recognized fact that
the purposes and goals of the two statutes are parallel, that is, to eliminate discrimination
in employment.  The only way to make the two laws consistent and insure that other
individuals do not find themselves in Mr. Cleary’s situation in the future is to enact
legislation such as that proposed by Chairman Grassley to close the existing loophole.63
Congress subsequently amended the ADEA in 1984 to extend its
coverage to U.S. citizens employed in foreign countries by U.S. entities or
their subsidiaries.64  This amendment modified the definition of “employee”
to include “any individual who is a citizen of the United States employed by
an employer in a workplace in a foreign country.”65  It also added an entire
subsection under the section entitled “Prohibition of age discrimination.”66
This added subsection states:
(h) Practices of foreign corporations controlled by American employers; foreign
employers not controlled by American employers; factors determining control
(1) If an employer controls a corporation whose place of incorporation is in a
foreign country, any practice by such corporation prohibited under this section
shall be presumed to be such practice by such employer.
(2) The prohibitions of this section shall not apply where the employer is a foreign
person not controlled by an American employer.
(3) For the purpose of this subsection the determination of whether an employer
controls a corporation shall be based upon the—
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67. Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, § 802(b)(1) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(1-3)
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68. S. REP. NO. 98-467, at 27-28 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 3000-3011.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 630(a), (b), and (f).
70. Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, § 802(a) (amending section 11(f) of the ADEA)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2000)).
71. Id.
72. Hearings:  Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, supra note 58, at 4-5.
(A) interrelation of operations,
(B) common management,
(C) centralized control of labor relations, and
(D) common ownership or financial control, of the employer and the
corporation.67
Congress believed that these amendments were “carefully worded to
apply only to citizens of the United States who are working for U.S.
corporations or their subsidiaries[, and that it would] not apply to foreign
nationals working for such corporations in a foreign workplace and it [would]
not apply to foreign companies which are not controlled by U.S. firms.”68
Accordingly, determining whether an employing entity (i.e., a “person” as
defined by 29 U.S.C. § 630(a)) is an “employer” covered by the ADEA is
simple enough when the entity at issue is a domestic enterprise that employs
twenty or more employees in the United States.69  The 1984 amendments
ensure that the same determination is made when the employing entity has
fewer than twenty employees working in the United States but also employs
a larger complement of U.S. citizens on foreign soil either directly or through
a subsidiary.70  By virtue of the 1984 amendments, the ADEA clearly applies
to these U.S. citizens working for U.S. employers or their subsidiaries on
foreign soil.71
The result is not so clear, however, when attempting to determine whether
the ADEA covers an employing entity that has fewer than twenty employees
working in the United States but that is owned or otherwise controlled by a
foreign entity that employs a larger complement of foreign individuals
working on foreign soil.  The text of the ADEA does not expressly and
unambiguously declare whether such employing entities are subject to the
ADEA under this narrow circumstance.  The colloquy between Senator
Grassley and Clarence Thomas at the Senate Subcommittee’s hearing on these
amendments72 is prophetic of the dilemma at hand:
Senator Grassley: I would like to ask you, though, if you have had an opportunity to
review the bill that we have drafted, whether or not you feel it is
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73. Id.
74. Michael Starr, Who’s the Boss?  The Globalization of U.S. Employment Law, 51 BUS. LAW.
635, 636 (1996) (citing 137 CONG. REC. H3934 (daily ed. June 5, 1991)).
75. Arylyn Tobias Gajilan & Jennifer Tanaka, Cyberscope:  Globetrotters’ Friend, NEWSWEEK,
June 22, 1998, at 8.
76. Foreign companies have purchased American companies such as Columbia Pictures, Zenith,
Firestone, and Southland/7-Eleven.  See After Japan:  South Korea’s Firms Are on a Buying Binge
Overseas.  Will They Repeat the Mistakes or the Successes of the Japanese?, ECONO MIST, Oct. 5, 1996,
at 17, 18.
77. See, e.g., Joyce Gannon, Plans for Luring Foreign Firms Aired, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Oct. 11, 2002, at C15 (reporting on local leaders’ trade and investment summit where discussions included
results of trade missions to Germany and the United Kingdom by Pittsburgh officials).
sufficient to close the loophole I suggest exists, and whether or not
you have some additional suggestions in regard to it.
Clarence Thomas: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have had an opportunity to look at it.  It is
rather brief.  Although the [EEOC] has not taken a position on
whether or not there should be legislation in this area, if you have
legislation, it should definitely be specific as to which employers are
covered.
For example, right now it is not clear from your draft bill whether
or not the term “employee” also includes employees of foreign
corporations.  We think that any legislation would have to
definitely be specific and indicate under what circumstances we
are to become involved in the area of discriminatory termination
of older employees.
Senator Grassley: Is the inference that our bill is not specific enough?
Clarence Thomas: That is right.
Senator Grassley: I appreciate that.73
Despite Thomas’s advice to Senator Grassley, Congress never clarified the
bill.
Twenty years have since passed, and during that time the
interconnectedness of the global marketplace has increased exponentially with
the end of the Cold War and the advent of technologies such as the Internet.
In 1991, at least 2,000 U.S. companies operated 21,000 overseas offices in 121
countries.74  By 1998, an estimated 300,000 Americans worked abroad.75
More importantly, for purposes of the interstice in ADEA coverage being
explored here, foreign firms began looking to operate or otherwise invest in
businesses on American soil.76  Local political leaders in the nation’s rust belt
frequently travel to other countries in efforts to attract foreign investments to
“create” jobs and increase the local tax base.77  Accordingly, an increasingly
global economy continues to put the text of the ADEA, and, indeed,
congressional will, to the test.
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78. Pietro S. Nivola, Having It All?  Domestic Regulations and the Global Economy, BROOKINGS
REV., Winter 1996, at 16, 18.
79. Minutillo v. Aqua Signal Corp., No. 96-3529C, 1997 WL 156495, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31,
1997) (discussing Title VII and the ADEA); Kim v. Dial Serv. Int’l, Inc., No. Civ. 96-3327 (DLC), 1997
WL 5902, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1997) (discussing the ADEA and Title VII); Robins v. Max Mara, U.S.A.,
Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII); Rao v. Kenya
Airways, Ltd., No. 94 Civ. 6103 (CSH), 1995 WL 366305, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1996) (discussing Title
VII); Goyette v. DCA Adver., Inc., 830 F. Supp. 737, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
80. Kim, 1997 WL 5902, at *3.
81. Robins, 914 F. Supp. at 1009.
82. Morelli v. Cedel, No. Civ. 96-2874 (MBM), 1997 WL 61499, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.).  The court notes
that the ADEA and Title VII use identical definitions of employer with the exception of the ADEA requiring
a statutory minimum of twenty employees while Title VII requires only fifteen.  Id. at *2 n.2.
83. No. 94 Civ. 6103 (CSH), 1995 WL 366305 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1996).
Some commentators suggest that the American economy was largely self-
contained when Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967—that is, foreign
companies rarely operated in the United States and American companies
rarely operated abroad.78  Assuming this is true, it is no wonder that the text
of the ADEA did not expressly address whether international workers were to
be counted with U.S. workers for purposes of determining coverage.
Subsequent amendments to the ADEA have done some to clarify this murky
issue, yet, as the Second Circuit’s decision in Morelli v. Cedel makes evident,
definitive resolution remains either elusive or flawed.
III.  INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE ADEA IN MORELLI V. CEDEL
Before Morelli, all federal courts that addressed the issue uniformly held
that only domestic employees of a foreign employer were to be counted for
purposes of satisfying the ADEA and Title VII statutory minimums.79  Even
within the Second Circuit, the weight of authority “held that the foreign
employees of a foreign corporation [did] not count towards the statutory
minimum required under the ADEA and Title VII.  Instead, the relevant group
is the number of employees in the United States.”80  In one opinion, the
District Court for the Southern District of New York explained:  “Only those
employees . . . who work in the United States for twenty or more calendar
weeks per year are to be counted for purposes of determining whether the
enterprise is covered by the provisions of the ADA, ADEA[,] and Title VII.”81
District courts within the Second Circuit acknowledged there were “no
Title VII or ADEA case[s] where a court considered foreign employees
outside the United States to find that the employer met the statutory
minimum.”82  In Rao v. Kenya Airways, Ltd.,83 a judge in the Southern District
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85. Id. at *2 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c)(2) (2000)).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c)(2) (stating Title VII does “not
apply with respect to the foreign operations of an employer that is a foreign person not controlled by an
American employer”).
87. Rao, 1995 WL 366305, at *2; accord Minutillo v. Aqua Signal Corp. No. 96-3529, 1997 WL
156495, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1997) (“[F]oreign employees of [defendant] may not be counted for Title
VII [or ADEA] purposes.”).
88. Appellant’s Joint Appendix at 107A, Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1998) (No. 97-7277)
[hereinafter Joint Appendix].
89. Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1998).
90. Joint Appendix, supra note 88, at 113A.
91. Appellee’s Brief at 2, Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1998) (No. 97-7277).
of New York specifically rejected the counting of foreign workers to reach the
statutory minimum under Title VII.84  The Rao court determined that while the
definition of employee does not specify that only those workers found within
the United States are counted under the statute, Title VII does specifically
reject its application “‘with respect to the foreign operations of an employer
that is a foreign person not controlled by an American Employer.’”85  In
extending limited extraterritorial application of the ADEA, these courts relied
upon the foreign employer exemption expressly set forth in the ADEA, which
states:  “The prohibitions of [the ADEA] shall not apply where the employer
is a foreign person not controlled by an American Employer.”86  If the foreign
operations of a foreign corporation is not considered an employer, the “foreign
employees of a foreign corporation are not considered employees . . . .”87
A.  An Unremarkable Case
Bland facts rarely garner much attention for a case and the facts of
Morelli are as straightforward and unexceptional as they come.  In a time
when discrimination cases can make headlines for either magnitude or
salaciousness, this case has neither.  On its facts, the case is simply a basic
workplace discrimination charge.  Maybe it should be little shock that from
a case warranting so little notice comes an opinion with such implications.88
Ida Morelli was employed in the New York branch office of defendant
Cedel Bank, S.A.89  Cedel, an international securities trading company,90
maintained its principal place of business and the majority of its employees
in Luxembourg.91  In addition to its main office, the firm operated satellite
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92. Id.
93. Id.; see also Affidavit of Percy P. Lopez, in Joint Appendix, supra note 87, at 71A.
94. Morelli, 141 F.3d at 41; see also Appellee’s Brief at 3, Morelli (No. 97-7277).
95. Morelli, 141 F.3d at 41; see also Appellee’s Brief at 3, Morelli (No. 97-7277).
96. Appellee’s Brief at 3, Morelli (No. 97-7277).
97. See Morelli, 141 F.3d at 40.  The record includes specific actions taken by the defendant upon
termination.  Those actions are not germane to the scope of this article.
98. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (Consol. 2003).
99. Morelli v. Cedel, No. Civ. 96-2874, 1997 WL 61499, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1997).  The ERISA
claim is not a subject of this note.
100. DHR Determination and Order, in Joint Appendix, supra note 88, at 67A-68A.
101. Amended Compliance at 96 Civ. 2874, in id. at 42A-50A.
102. Morelli, 1997 WL 61499, at *2.
offices in London, Tokyo and Hong Kong,92 as well as a mere eleven
employee office in New York.93
Hired in 1984, Morelli worked as an administrative assistant from the
time Cedel opened its New York branch office until being discharged in
1994.94  Her discharge came less than one year after the instillation of a new
head of the New York office.95  Following Morelli’s departure, Cedel had no
employees over the age of forty in New York.96  Morelli was fifty-five at the
time.97
Shortly after her termination, Morelli filed a complaint with the New
York State Division of Human Rights (NYDHR) alleging violations of the
New York Human Rights Act (NYHRA),98 the ADEA, and the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).99  After its investigation, the
NYDHR found no probable cause to believe Cedel had engaged in
discriminatory action and issued a determination order dismissing the
complaint.100  Having complied with the administrative prerequisites, Morelli
exercised her right to file suit in federal court and brought suit under the
NYHRA, ADEA, and ERISA.101
Cedel moved for dismissal of the ADEA claim on the basis of lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, contending that it employed only eleven workers
in its New York office.102  Cedel argued that it did not meet the ADEA’s
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103. Id.  Circuits are split on the question of whether the employee statutory minimum is a
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104. See Morelli, 1997 WL 61499, at *2.
105. Id.
106. See id.; see also Appellant’s Brief at 3, Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1998) (No.
97-7277).
107. Id.
108. Goyette v. DCA Adver., Inc., 830 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
109. Id. at 745; see also Morelli v. Cedel, No. Civ. 96-2874, 1997 WL 61499, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
13, 1997).  The term “employer” is defined under Title VII, § 2000e(b) as “a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
110. Goyette, 830 F. Supp. at 745.
definition of employer,103 that the ADEA did not apply to it, and, therefore,
that the complaint must be dismissed.104
Morelli agreed that Cedel did not employ the required twenty employees
within the United States, but insisted that jurisdiction was still appropriate105
because Cedel employed hundreds of workers world-wide.106  These
employees, the plaintiff argued, should be counted in reaching the statutory
minimum.107  On this most basic issue formed the question:  How does one
count to twenty under the ADEA?
B.  Getting It Right:  The Southern District of New York
To support her position before the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Morelli cited Goyette v. DCA Advertising
Inc.108  In Goyette, the same district court had found that Dentsu, Inc.,
Defendant DCA’s foreign corporate parent based in Japan, could be held
liable for its subsidiary’s Title VII violations even though the parent did not
employ the statutory minimum of fifteen employees required by Title VII.109
The Goyette court reasoned that although Denstu did not have any domestic
employees under a common law interpretation of the word, “that fact [was]
irrelevant given the nature of Dentsu’s control over DCA’s firing policies,”110
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the ADEA and Title VII); Robins v. Max Mara, U.S.A., 914 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing
the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII); Rao v. Kenya Airways, Ltd., No. Civ. 94-6103, 1995 WL 366305, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1996) (discussing Title VII)).
117. Morelli, 1997 WL 61499, at *3.
118. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2000)).
119. Id.
120. Wolf v. J.I. Case Co., 617 F. Supp. 858, 866 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
and Dentsu’s discriminatory policy, “which affected more than fifteen
employees in the United States.”111
The Morelli district court acknowledged that although similarities
between Title VII and the ADEA112 sometimes permit analogizing the
interpretations of one statute to aid the interpretations of the other, Goyette
was not on point.113  The key distinction, the district court noted, was that the
Goyette court did not count the foreign employees,114 as Morelli requested
here.115  The court further pointed out that the “plaintiff cites no Title VII or
ADEA case where a court considered foreign employees outside the United
States to find that the employer met the statutory minimum.”116
The Morelli district court ultimately held that it is entirely inappropriate
to count foreign workers employed overseas—not only are they not
“employees” protected under the statute, but also the ADEA does not apply
to foreign operations of foreign companies.117  The court reasoned that while
the last sentence of the definition of employee in § 630(f) does extend the
definition to include some workers overseas, it is expressly limited to
“citizen[s] of the United States.”118
To substantiate its determination, the district court pointed out that prior
to 1984, the ADEA did not protect American citizens employed overseas even
when working for a U.S. company.119  “[C]ourts which have considered the
question have uniformly held that the ADEA . . . [did] not apply
extraterritorially.”120  It was only through an amendment to the ADEA
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Americans, supra note 58, at 3; see also Cleary, 728 F.2d at 607.
123. Morelli v. Cedel, No. Civ. 96-2874, 1997 WL 61499, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1997).
124. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(1)-(2) (2000).
125. Morelli, 1997 WL 61499, at *3 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259
(1991) (internal citation omitted)).
designed to close a “loophole” that enabled American companies to transfer
workers to subsidiaries overseas and then discriminate against them on the
basis of age121 that the statute was extended to protect U.S. citizens employed
by a U.S. company or a foreign company controlled by a domestic entity.122
The Morelli court reasoned that because the 1984 amendments
established that the ADEA does not apply to the foreign operations of a
foreign company, the foreign employees of those companies should not be
counted for jurisdictional purposes.123  The court pointed to the new language
of § 623(h):
(1) If an employer controls a corporation whose place of incorporation is in a foreign
country, any practice by such corporation prohibited under this section shall be presumed
to be such practice by such employer.
(2) The prohibitions of this section shall not apply where the employer is a foreign person
not controlled by an American employer.124
As the Morelli district court explained, even the Supreme Court
recognized that the very purpose of the 1984 amendment, which added the last
sentence of the definition of employer, “was ‘to mak[e] provisions of the
[ADEA] apply to citizens of the United States employed in foreign countries
by U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries.”’125  The Morelli court echoed the
Supreme Court’s conclusion:
If [the definition of employee] did not include United States citizens employed abroad
until the 1984 amendment, and the 1984 amendment applied only to United States
citizens employed abroad, then, in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the
amendment, § 630(f) [the definition of employee] does not include foreign citizens
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employed abroad.  Indeed, in the 1984 amendments Congress . . . could have included
foreign employees employed abroad.  [But] [b]ecause foreign employees employed
abroad are not “employees” within the ADEA’s definition of “employee,” § 630(f), they
should not be counted as “employees” under § 630(b) to determine whether an employer
has the minimum number of employees.126
When considered with the amendment to § 623(h), the 1984 amendments
to § 630(f), which expand the definition of employee to include those U.S.
citizens working abroad, “establish that the ADEA applies only to United
States citizens working abroad for United States companies or their foreign
subsidiaries, and not to United States citizens employed by foreign
companies.”127  The district court reasoned that “[i]t makes no sense to count
as employees under § 630(b) foreign employees, who are not protected by the
ADEA, of foreign companies, which are not subject to the ADEA.”128
“Thus,” the court summarized as it dismissed Ida Morelli’s ADEA claim,
“foreign employees employed outside the United States are not counted as
employees to meet the statutory minimum under § 630(b) both because they
are not “employees” protected by the statute and because the prohibitions of
the ADEA do not apply to a foreign company’s foreign operations.”129  But
such a clear, consistent analysis was not destined to last long as the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the lower court’s decision.
C.  The Second Circuit Veers Off-Course
Like the district court before it, the Second Circuit began its analysis with
an acknowledgment of the undisputed fact that Cedel was “a foreign employer
with fewer than 20 employees in its sole U.S. branch.”130  However, the
similarities to the lower court’s analysis ended as quickly as they began.
The court next turned to the portion of the ADEA that Congress added in
1984.  As discussed in part IIIA, Congress added § 2(h)(2) in direct response
to the courts’ decisions that “the ADEA did not apply to ‘Americans
employed outside the United States by American employers.’”131  Through this
amendment, the statute now provides “[t]he prohibitions of this section shall
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137. Id. Section 11(f) of the ADEA is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (2002).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2000).
139. Id. § 623(h)(1).
140. The exception, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1), insulates employers from liability for “practices
involv[ing] an employee in a workplace in a foreign country” where compliance with the ADEA “would
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which such workplace is located.”  29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).  See Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d
447 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that due to § 623(f)(1), defendant, Radio Free Europe, need not comply with
not apply where the employer is a foreign person not controlled by an
American employer.”132
The Second Circuit recognized and dismissed the idea that this new
subsection “might suggest that the ADEA . . . does not apply to the domestic
operations of foreign employers.”133  Instead, the court explained the “plain
language . . . is not necessarily decisive if it is inconsistent with Congress’
clearly expressed legislative purpose,”134 and that the context of the 1984
amendment “reveals that Congress’ purpose was not to exempt the domestic
workplaces of foreign employers from the ADEA’s prohibition[s].”135  Rather,
the court reasoned, the purpose of this provision “was to limit the reach of an
extraterritorial amendment adopted as part of the same legislation.”136
The extraterritorial amendment referenced by the Second Circuit
contained three parts.  The first part modified the definition of employee137 to
include “any individual who is a citizen of the United States employed by an
employer in a workplace in a foreign country.”138  In other words, the
extraterritorial amendment provided ADEA coverage to Americans working
overseas for companies meeting the ADEA definition of employer.  This
definitional amendment was, the court noted, coupled with an expansion of
the statute to impute liability on a U.S. parent corporation for the
discriminatory actions of a foreign subsidiary corporation it controls.  This
second part of the amendment provided that “[i]f an employer controls a
corporation whose place of incorporation is in a foreign country, any practice
by such corporation prohibited under this section shall be presumed to be such
practice by such employer.”139  Finally, as the Second Circuit points out, in
addition to expanding the scope of the statute in the first two parts to the 1984
extraterritorial amendment, Congress also limited the impact of the
amendments through a “foreign law exception.”140  This third part was merely
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the ADEA and maintain employment for its American employees in Munich where compliance with the
ADEA would cause the violation of a lawful collective bargaining agreement mandating retirement when
employees reach the age of sixty-five).
141. Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-467, at 27 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 3000).
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1(c)(2), 12112(c)(2)(b) (2000)).
144. Both the ADA and Title VII were amended as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  See Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109(a), 105 Stat. 1077 (1991).
145. Morelli, 141 F.3d at 43.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 44.
intended to “conform the ADEA’s reach to ‘the well-established principle of
sovereignty, that no nation has the right to impose its labor standards on
another country.’”141  Analyzing these three parts together, the Second Circuit
rationalized that “[t]here is no evidence in the legislative history that these
amendments were intended to restrict the application of the ADEA with
respect to domestic operations of foreign employers.”142
The Second Circuit further opined that the ADEA’s statutory cousins,
namely Title VII and the ADA, expressly limit their exclusions to the “foreign
operations of an employer that is a foreign person not controlled by an
American employer.”143  As there is no legislative history for these
provisions144 evidencing Congress’s intention to create any such difference in
scope between the ADEA and Title VII or the ADA, “[i]t is not apparent why
the domestic operations of foreign companies should be subject to Title VII
and the ADA, but not to the ADEA.”145  Such an exemption, the Second
Circuit concluded, would undercut the very purpose of the ADEA to promote
the employment of older persons.146
Leaving aside the fact that these provisions presume the foreign company
is already an “employer” for jurisdictional purposes, in other words, the court
concluded that because the plain language of the ADEA’s sister statutes only
excluded the overseas operations of non-U.S. controlled foreign businesses,
the ADEA, which does not contain any similar language, should be read to
provide identical coverage.
The Second Circuit next turned to the question of whether overseas
employees can be counted in determining whether a foreign employer is
subject to the ADEA through the counting of overseas workers.147  After
concluding that, as originally drafted, the broad language in the definition of
“employee” does not apply to restrict the scope of coverage but merely







154. Id. at 44-45.
provides a numerical minimum, the court analyzed the ADEA following the
1984 amendments.148
In the Second Circuit’s view, the 1984 amendment supplements the
definition of employee to include U.S. citizens employed overseas by an
employer.149  The court reasoned that “[t]his revision . . . does not establish
that the employees, wherever located, of a foreign corporation with a U.S.
branch are not ‘employees’ under the ADEA” because the statute does not
make a distinction between domestic and foreign employers.150  Further, the
court reasons, the § 623(h)(2) exclusion of ADEA protections for an
individual working overseas for an employer that is foreign and not controlled
by an American employer does not provide support for only counting domestic
employees; § 623(h)(2) was only intended to limit liability with respect to
those foreign workers.151  Consequently, “if Congress had wished to restrict
the definition of ‘employee’ to exclude a foreign employer’s foreign workers,
it certainly could have done so directly when it amended [the definition of
employee] in 1984.”152  In essence, while Congress was amending the ADEA
to provide protections for Americans working overseas, Congress could also
have limited the definition of employee to specifically exclude a foreign
employer’s workers.  But because Congress did not, the court rationalized, the
1984 extraterritorial amendments supplement the definition of employer rather
than restrict it.
The court concluded that merely because the overseas employees of a
foreign employer are not protected by the ADEA does not mean that they
should not be counted.153  After all, the court reasoned, the ADEA counts
employees under age forty even though they do not receive the protections of
the statute.154  So because neither the original ADEA nor the 1984
extraterritorial amendments exclude the counting of foreign workers employed
overseas, the counting of those foreign workers must be permitted, making
Cedel an employer under the ADEA even though it employed only eleven in
its U.S. operations.
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155. As an introduction to, or as a vehicle for, statutory interpretation and jurisprudential theories,
professors and scholars alike often utilize a hypothetical where it is asked if a city’s park ordinance banning
the use of vehicles in the park includes the use of bicycles, horses, or just motor-driven conveyances.  Of
course, even with the narrowest interpretation of vehicle, the Socratic method tends to lead even the wariest
student to eventually ban electric wheelchairs and remote-controlled cars.  See generally H.L.A. Hart,
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958).
156. EARL T. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 1 (Gaunt, Inc. 1999) (1940).
IV.  ANATOMY  OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S FLANKING MANEUVER
How did the Second Circuit find statutory authorization permitting a
broad interpretation of the coverage of the ADEA when every court that had
addressed similar issues merely found limitations?  A careful reading of the
Second Circuit’s opinion in Morelli demonstrates the court’s unwillingness
to be faithful to congressional intent despite a stated intention to do so.
Students of the various theories of statutory construction will recognize that
the Second Circuit claims to be ascribing to an intentionalist approach, yet it
employs a hodge-podge of approaches—mostly dynamic—to arrive at its
desired result.  A result, in this instance, through which the Second Circuit
clearly supplants its will for that of Congress.
While most readers will be familiar with the basic canons of statutory
interpretation, a brief review of some of the major precepts is appropriate.
The purpose of this Article remains, however, not to propose a theory of
statutory interpretation or even to explore the many theories that exist.
Rather, we explicate the flaws in the Second Circuit’s reasoning under the
model it claims to use in reaching its decision in Morelli.  In analyzing the
court’s rationale we do not decide what an employee is under the ADEA.  In
other words, we do not seek to determine, in the oft-used jurisprudential
example, what constitutes a vehicle when applying a park ordinance
prohibiting the use of vehicles,155 but, rather, demonstrate that the statute—the
ADEA—was not even intended to apply to this park, i.e., foreign workers
employed by foreign businesses.
A.  Three Interpretive Theories: An Analytical Framework for Statutory
Interpretation
A statute generally is considered to be “the written will of the legislature
expressed according to the form necessary to constitute it a law of the state,
and rendered authentic by certain prescribed forms and solemnities.”156
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157. “Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before
it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it . . . .”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-45 (1983).
158. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret that rule.”).
159. For a general discussion on this topic, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 2 (1994).
160. One commentator has opined that “[b]y degrees, . . . our extensive level of social ambition leads
us to a very complex set of legal rules, . . . which only lawyers can understand and navigate, and then at
very stiff fees.”  RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD  xi (1995).
161. Just such an example is found within the tax code which empowers the Secretary of the Treasury
Department to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of the [Code]” I.R.C.
§ 7805(a) (2003).
162. ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 159, at 2.
163. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding, in
part, that executive branch regulations should be granted substantial deference when not contrary to the
statutory scheme).  In reviewing the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) interpretation of the Clear
Air Act, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, as a threshold matter, courts must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress, but that if a statute does not unambiguously express
Congress’s intent then such courts must give deference to an agency’s permissible construction of the
Article I, Section 7, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, known as the
bicameralism and presentment clause, provides the forms and solemnities
necessary for the Congress to impose its will by enacting such statutes.157
The statutory will of Congress is neither self-enforcing nor self-
interpreting—our Constitutional Republic is comprised of three equal
branches of government expected to impose checks and balances on one
another.  The judicial branch is to interpret congressional will,158 and the
executive branch is to enforce congressional will as interpreted by the
judiciary.
The evolution of the modern regulatory bureaucracy complicates the
delicate balance of power conceived by the founders and accentuates the
critical importance of statutory interpretation and application.159  To maintain
the regulatory state, Congress enacts statutes with ever increasing frequency.
As this abundance of statutory law has grown, the law has become more
detailed in its prescriptions.160  Too often, Congress directs its will, not to the
citizenry, but an executive bureaucracy,161 which by design was intended to
apply the law, not create it.
Indeed, “the legitimacy and operation” of congressional will sometimes
rest with the department, agency, bureau, commission, or official whose job
it is to enforce the statute.162  These executive branch delegates, or regulatory
communities, have been given considerable deference in their interpretations
of the statutes they are charged with enforcing.163   Yet oftentimes they are
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statute that it enforces.  Id. at 844.
164. For a brief discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court’s involvement in statutory construction vis-à-
vis constitutional interpretation, see ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 159, at 2.
165. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 103 (Alexander Hamilton) (Tudor Publ’g Co. 1937).  Ironically, the
meaning of this passage, beyond the plain words of the text, is subject to some debate.  Eskridge, Frickey,
and Garrett suggest that Hamilton’s “warning was sounded in connection with [his] discussion of judicial
review and not of statutory interpretation.”  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATIVE AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 232 n.37 (2000) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETATION].  Yet these
commentators appear to ignore the directly preceding sentences of Federalist No. 78, which state:  “It can
be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure
to the constitutional intentions of the legislature.  This might as well happen in the case of two contradictory
statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute.”  FEDERALIST NO. 78,
supra, at 103.
166. ESKRIDGE, JR., supra note 159, at 9.
167. Id.
unaccountable to the citizenry and operate unchecked, executing personal or
institutional interpretations of a given statute upon members of the public
without the resources or stamina to resist.
Accordingly, the judiciary must increase its vigilance in conducting
statutory interpretations164 to prevent further erosion of congressional will by
the executive branch.  Of course the judiciary must also be disciplined so as
not to supplant its own will for that of the legislature.  As Alexander Hamilton
admonished in Federalist No. 78, “[t]he courts must declare the sense of the
law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT,
the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of
the legislative body.”165
Academics and jurists who ascribe to the school of “dynamic statutory
construction” refuse to heed Hamilton’s admonishment.  This crowd eschews
“original intent” and “plain meaning” approaches to statutory construction,
and describes the underlying precepts of such intentionalist approaches as a
“dubious description of practical reality, and a dreary aspiration for our
polity.”166
Dynamic theories of statutory interpretation adhere to the belief that one
cannot interpret the meaning of a statute as not fixed until it is applied to
concrete circumstances and that the meaning is neither uncommon nor
illegitimate for the meaning of a provision to change over time.167  By contrast,
the intentionalist approaches emphasize legislative intent as the goal of
statutory interpretation.  Accordingly, the executive and judicial branches, as
well as the citizenry, should apply legislative directives in a manner consistent
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168. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETATION, supra note 165, at 214 n.7.
169. See Lecture by Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The Role of U.S.
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws (Mar. 8-9, 1995), available at
http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/scalia97.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2004), in ANTONIN SCALIA,
A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutman ed., 1997); see also Bank
One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring, in part);
Chisom v. Toemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  See generally William Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
170. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETATION, supra note 165, at 228.
171. Id. at 229.
172. CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 10 n.6 (2002).
173. For example, in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 882-83 (1994), Justice Kennedy ignores the text
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, in a challenge to a rural Georgia county’s single-member county
commission as volatile of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and instead relies on legislative
history as controlling the rule of decision.
with the legislature’s expectations and intent when enacting a particular
statute.168
The third grouping of interpretative theories, known as textualist theories,
seek to apply the “plain meaning” of statutory text either as the best evidence
of legislative intent or as the only authoritative basis for interpretation.  One
version of textualism, known as the “new textualism,” has been ascribed to by
Justice Scalia in several of his judicial opinions and in the Tanner Lectures at
Princeton University.169  The new textualism “holds that the only object of
statutory interpretation is to determine the meaning of the text and that the
only legitimate sources for this inquiry are text-based or text-linked
sources.”170  According to Justice Scalia, this method is most consistent with
the rule of law and the separation of judicial and legislative powers.171
Courts often times use an amalgamation of interpretive theories.  For its
part, the United States Supreme Court almost invariably purports to begin any
interpretive process with the statutory text.172  The Justices have employed
varying interpretive analyses, however, ranging from text-oriented approaches
to approaches willing to subsume the statutory text, and, at times, to ignore it
in furtherance of a results-oriented approach.173  Sometimes the statutory text
is the beginning and the end of the interpretive process; at other times it is
merely the beginning of the process; and still at other times, the text is simply
not part of the process.
In Morelli, the Second Circuit ignored the statutory text of the ADEA and
employed a dynamic interpretive methodology—under the intellectually
dishonest guise of an intentionalist approach—to conclude that the
congressional purpose of protecting older employees from discrimination
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174. Perin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
175. 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) (2002).
176. Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1998).
177. See MAMMEN, supra note 172, at 31-32 (“In general, before the Court will cite legislative
history, it must have determined that the statutory text, interpreted on its own, meets a threshold level of
uncertainty.  Typically, this uncertainty takes the form of ambiguity or absurdity.”).
178. Morelli, 141 F.2d at 42.
179. See Goyette v. DCA Adver., Inc., 830 F. Supp. 737, 745 (S.D.N.Y 1993); EEOC v. Kloster
Cruise Ltd., 888 F. Supp 147, 149-51 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (rejecting defendant claims to the contrary and
holding that § 4(h)(2) does not provide for the wholesale exclusion of foreign companies from ADEA
compliance); Helm v. S. African Airways, No. Civ. 84-5404 (MJL), 1987 WL 13195, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
June 25, 1987) (“We find nothing in the ADEA or its legislative history to indicate that the 1984
amendments were intended to exclude American citizens working within the United States from
coverage.”).
would be furthered if the will of Congress, as expressed clearly in the text of
the statute, were ignored.
B.  The Second Circuit’s Strained Reasoning
The Second Circuit’s plain language analysis as applied in Morelli is
flawed.  “A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning.”174  Consequently, the 1984 amendments,
particularly § 4(h)(2)—which specifies that the “prohibitions of this section
shall not apply where the employer is a foreign person not controlled by an
American employer”175—should be given its plain language meaning; all
foreign firms are exempt from the ADEA unless controlled by an American
corporation.  Even the Second Circuit in Morelli acknowledges that “[a]n
absolutely literal reading of § 4(h)(2) might suggest that the ADEA also does
not apply to the domestic operations of foreign employers.”176  In stating so,
the Second Circuit implicitly admits that the text of the ADEA is clear
enough, yet reaches for the legislative history not to clarify, but to
obfuscate.177
The Second Circuit chose to ignore the express will of Congress and
offered the excuse that statutory language is “not necessarily decisive if it is
inconsistent with Congress’ clearly expressed legislative purpose.”178  The
Second Circuit contends that the purpose of § 4(h)(2) was not to create an
exemption for foreign employers within the United States, but to limit the
reach of the concurrent extraterritorial expansion.  There is some case law to
support this position.179
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180. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1037, at 28 (1984).
181. See Morelli, 141 F.3d at 44.
182. “Accordingly, in determining whether Cedel satisfies the ADEA’s 20-employee threshold,
employees cannot be ignored merely because they work overseas.”  Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 45 (2d
Cir. 1998).  “We do not follow the district courts that have concluded—without apparent exception—that
only the domestic employees of a foreign employer are counted . . . .”  Id. at 45 n.1.
183. Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92, 94 (8th Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
184. Tonika v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995).
185. Id. (citing 110 CONG. REC. S. 13,092 (1964) (statement of Sen. Cotton); 110 CONG. REC. S.
13,088 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 110 CONG. REC. S. 13,092-93 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Morse)).
However, the so-called “clearly expressed legislative purpose”
propounded by the Second Circuit does not support a conclusion that
Congress intended the ADEA to require the counting of foreign workers
employed overseas by foreign-controlled businesses.  The House Report
concerning the 1984 amendment clearly proclaims that “the amendment is
carefully worded to apply only to citizens of the United States who are
working for U.S. corporations or their subsidiaries.”180  Yet the Second Circuit
relies on this “carefully worded” text to reach the negative inference that
because Congress did not choose to exclude a foreign employer’s foreign
workers, it is appropriate to count them to reach the statutory minimum.181  By
that rational, the ADEA mandated the counting of foreign workers even before
the statute was amended, a conclusion in conflict with the decisions of every
court that had addressed the matter before the Second Circuit did so in
Morelli.182
One circuit court has determined that when analyzing a remedial statute
such as the ADEA, “[a] procedural requirement of the Act, of doubtful
meaning in a given case, should not be interpreted to deny an employee a
claim for relief unless to do so would clearly further some substantial goal of
the Act.”183  The statutory minimum, however, which is designed to protect
small employers, is far from a mere procedural requirement.  The floor debate
over the ADEA’s analogous statute, Title VII, as described in Tomka v. Seiler
Corp.,184 indicates that the costs associated with defending against
discrimination claims was a factor in the decision to implement a minimum
employee requirement.185  Of course, this rationale further suggests that
Congress might not have intended the Act to govern foreign employers
operating small domestic offices.
The Second Circuit’s holding, taken to its logical conclusion, could easily
result in the ADEA’s application to a foreign company with just one U.S.
employee and nineteen world-wide employees.  Certainly, such a situation
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186. Palmer v. Ark. Council on Econ. Educ., 154 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Kelly v.
Wauconda Park Dist., 801 F.2d 269, 272 n.3 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987)).
would create precisely the burden Congress had intended to avoid by
establishing a twenty employee jurisdictional minimum.
C.  Equal Standards or Unequal Burdens?
In addition to protecting small businesses from the “costs” of compliance,
“Congress based its twenty-employee minimum on ‘the practical consideration
that a larger employer with more varied jobs could more constructively utilize
an older worker’s skills.’”186  When a foreign employer has fewer than twenty
employees working within the United States, there is no variety of jobs in
which the employer can utilize the employee’s skills.  In the example of the
not unlikely outgrowth of the Second Circuit’s Morelli holding raised above,
where there exists only one worker employed domestically, in order to
“utilize” the employee’s skills the employer will be forced to transfer the
individual overseas.  This is problematic.  Skills, language, abilities, and the
like do not necessarily translate to cross-border employment, yet liability
remains.
Furthermore, enforcement of the ADEA against the foreign firm with a
very small domestic office is likely to result in greater harm to the domestic
employee than if the ADEA did not provide protections at all.  Foreign
employers will know that their overseas operations are expressly excluded
from coverage under the Act.  As a result, the foreign employer can transfer
its domestic employees to an overseas office merely for the pretext of
termination or other discriminatory practice.  The American citizen who could
have been let go within the United States and possibly sought a remedy
through state anti-discrimination laws which usually have significantly lower
statutory minimums will be discriminated upon, terminated, and stranded in
a foreign country without remedy.
The 1984 amendment closed the loophole in the ADEA that enabled
domestic firms to engage in this practice.  Matters of international comity will,
however, always restrict Congress from closing the loophole enabling foreign
employers to engage in this shell-game.  Congress certainly could not have
intended to provide an end-run around compliance with the ADEA, but the
Morelli court’s holding does just that and in a manner bound to realize even
greater harm to the very citizens the statute was intended to protect.
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187. See Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1998).
188. Wolf v. J.I. Case Co., 617 F. Supp. 858, 866 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (citing Youakim v. Miller, 425
U.S. 231, 235 (1976)); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
(holding, in part, that executive branch regulations should be granted substantial deference when not
contrary to the statutory scheme).
189. Yerdon v. Henry, 91 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 1996) (analyzing the weight that should be given to
EEOC guidelines and interpretations of Title VII).
190. Id. at 376 (citations omitted).
191. Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976)); see also EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 287 (1991) (applying the Gilbert standard and rejecting the EEOC’s
interpretation that Title VII applies extraterritorially because, in part, the interpretation contradicted the
statute’s plain language).
192. 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984); see supra note 121 for discussion of Cleary.
193. Cleary, 728 F.2d at 610 n.6.
194. Id.
D.  The Role of the EEOC
In Morelli, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the EEOC
guidelines were persuasive in their determination that the ADEA applies to the
domestic operations of foreign firms.187  “It is well-established that the
interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with its enforcement is
entitled to great deference.”188  As noted by the Second Circuit in Yerdon v.
Henry,189 however, the EEOC does not necessarily have deferential authority
to issue rules or regulations.190  “Thus, the weight accorded a particular EEOC
guideline or interpretation . . . depends upon the ‘thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control.’”191
Courts have not always been persuaded by the guidelines promulgated by
the EEOC.  In Cleary v. United States Lines, Inc.,192 the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the court should defer to the
EEOC’s interpretation of the ADEA merely under the general rule of deferring
to the interpretation of the agency charged with enforcement of a statute.193
Instead, the Third Circuit determined that the question of whether or not the
ADEA applied extraterritorially “is a matter of pure statutory construction,
and agency expertise is not controlling.”194  Nevertheless, even giving due
regard to the EEOC’s guidelines, the Commission’s interpretation lacks
significant support earning little, if any, weight.
In determining that the ADEA governs the actions of a foreign firm
operating in the United States, the EEOC merely asserts that the employer is
“subject to the Act” because “a foreign employer enjoys the benefits and
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195. EEOC Policy Guidance, –915.039, Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) ¶ 5183 (Mar. 3, 1989) [hereinafter
EEOC Policy Guidance].
196. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2) (2000)).
197. Reyes-Gaona v. N.C. Growers Ass’n, Inc., 250 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the
EEOC’s contention that the 1984 Amendment provided ADEA coverage for foreign nationals who apply
in foreign countries for jobs in the United States).
198. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil, Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259 (1991) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-467
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2974, 2975).
199. EEOC Policy Guidance, supra note 195.
protections of United States Law when employing individuals in the United
States.”195  This conclusion completely lacks any analysis.  The guidelines
acknowledge the 1984 amendment to § 4(h), which specifies “[t]he
prohibitions of this section shall not apply where the employer is a foreign
person not controlled by an American employer,”196 but they address the
apparent plain language which suggests that the statute does not extend to any
foreign firm unless that firm is controlled by an American company.  While
it is generally true that compliance with domestic laws merely constitutes a
cost of conducting business within the United States, Congress’s selection of
this specific language certainly must be provided greater weight than an
unsubstantiated conclusion by a self interested bureaucracy seeking to expand
its reach.
“[T]he doctrine of expressio unis est exclusio alterius instructs that where
a law expressly describes a particular situation to which it shall apply, what
was omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded.”197  As the
Supreme Court recognized, “[t]he expressed purpose” of the 1984 ADEA
amendments “was to ‘make provisions of the Act apply to citizens of the
United States employed in foreign countries by U.S. corporations or their
subsidiaries.’”198  Even the EEOC acknowledges that “Congress amended the
ADEA because it wanted to ensure that the citizens of the United States who
are employed overseas by American Firms or their subsidiaries enjoy similar
protections as citizens and aliens employed in the United States.”199  Clearly
an amendment which was enacted to address a specific issue and drafted in
specific language should not be subject to expansion through the interpretation
of a mere governmental agency and in contravention of the canons of statutory
interpretation.
2004] MORELLI v. CEDEL:  INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE ADEA 539
200. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 101, 104 Stat. 978 (1990)
(codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-626 (2000)).
201. See Wolf v. J.I. Case Co., 617 F. Supp. 858, 865 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
202. See id.
203. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, §§ 101-105, 104 Stat. 978-983 (1990).
204. Hearings:  Age Discrimination and Overseas Americans, supra note 58, at 2 (statement of Sen.
Grassley).
205. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991).
206. Melody Kubo, Extraterritorial Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 2 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 259, 274 (2001).
207. Protection of Extraterritorial Employment Amendments, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(4), 12112(c) (2000) (ADA) and
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(c) (2000) (Title VII)).
208. Kubo, supra note 206, at 274.
E.  The Second Circuit’s Decision: Fixing a “Black Hole” or Falling Down
the “Rabbit Hole”?
Historically, Congress has been quick to disagree with judicial
interpretations of the ADEA and Title VII, responding promptly with statutory
amendments whenever it thought the judiciary misread its intentions.
Although Congress has viewed its amendments as an effort “to restore the
original congressional intent.”200 courts have refused to apply these
“clarifications” retroactively,201 and instead have regarded them as expanding
the scope of the statute’s protections.202  Regardless of whether the
amendments enlarge the scope of the ADEA or simply clarify and restate its
existing scope, the histories of the 1984 and 1990 ADEA amendments, as well
as the 1991 amendment to Title VII, show a congressional response to specific
judicial holdings it deemed distasteful.
As discussed in section IIIA, the 1984 passage of the Older Americans
Protection Act203 was a direct response to the Third Circuit’s holding in
Cleary that that the ADEA did not confer protections for American employees
working overseas for American companies.204  Similarly, after the Supreme
Court held that Title VII did not operate extraterritorially to protect U.S.
citizens working abroad for American employers in Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Arabian American Oil Co.,205 “Congress almost
immediately responded to the Supreme Court’s decision”206 by amending both
Title VII and the ADA207 with language similar to the extraterritorial
provisions of the ADEA.208
This history of legislative activism demonstrates that Congress is anxious
to prevent American employees from falling into a “black hole” of non-
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209. Joint Appendix, supra note 88, at 29A, 36A.
210. This is a safe assumption, given the similarities between the three statutes.  See, e.g., Robinson
coverage and will act whenever it becomes necessary to clarify its true intent.
This process is how the framers intended the divided branches of our
Constitutional Republic to operate, and Congress’s reticence in this instance
does not justify the judiciary’s legislation-making actions, as seen in Morelli.
The unstated motive underlying results-oriented decisions like Morelli
appear to be the inclusion of putative employment discrimination victims
within the protections of the various federal employment discrimination
statutes—that is, preventing them from falling into the “black hole” of non-
coverage.  But the result is more akin to Alice’s journey down the rabbit hole
with a “Queen of Hearts” judiciary, rather than the politically accountable
legislative process.
In its zeal to cast a safety net over this perceived deficiency of the ADEA,
the Morelli court ignored the fact that one of the causes of action asserted by
Ms. Morelli was a claim that Cedel violated the New York Human Rights
Act.209  Most employing entities in the United States will, to a certain degree,
find themselves subject to one or more of the various state or local
employment discrimination statutes and ordinances.  Calls for protecting
putative victims of invidious employment discrimination employed by small
domestic outposts of foreign employers do not go unheeded in the absence of
ADEA coverage; all but the smallest of employing entities are covered by
state statutes and local ordinances oftentimes paralleling the protections of
their federal counterparts.
Rather than allow the genius of our federal system to operate as intended,
courts, such as the Morelli court, ignore the plain text of the applicable statute
and contort well-reasoned principles of statutory construction to prevent a
result perceived by it as distasteful.  In doing so, such courts usurp the role of
Congress and create more problems than they solve—all the reason why such
decisions are best left to Congress.
V.  CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s well-intentioned, albeit flawed, decision in Morelli
poses broad implications for the global enforcement of American employment
discrimination laws.  Indeed, every significant shift in the application of the
ADA, the ADEA, or Title VII potentially herald a change in the collective
jurisprudence of all three statutes.210  In that regard, Morelli has and will
2004] MORELLI v. CEDEL:  INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE ADEA 541
v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well-established that ADEA claims
are analyzed in the same manner as are claims under Title VII.”); Marsili v. Arlington Heights Fire Dep’t,
990 F. Supp. 578, 581 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“The ADA, the ADEA, and Title VII use the same definition
of ‘employer.’”); see also Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92, 94 (8th Cir. 1975) (“The similarity
between Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Age Discrimination Act should also be recognized.”)
(citations omitted).
211. See Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2003).  In this recent case, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon Morelli v. Cedel to hold that the overseas workers employed by the
foreign subsidiary of a small American company could be counted to reach the statutory minimum for Title
VII.  Id. at 816.  Kang presents the paradigmatic case for the risks inherent in liberal interpretations of the
anti-discrimination statutes.  Rather than finding authority solely in the text of Title VII, the court in Kang
relied upon the Second Circuit’s decision in Morelli to hold that Title VII should be expanded to count
overseas workers.  Id. (discussing the Second Circuit’s holding that overseas workers should be counted
although not covered by the ADEA, the Ninth Circuit stated:  “The Morelli court so concluded due, in part,
to the policies behind limiting Title VII coverage . . . .”).  Of course, in Morelli, the Second Circuit, without
express authority in the language of the ADEA, relied upon the language and amendments of Title VII to
hold that the ADEA has a similar overseas coverage as Title VII.  See Morelli v. Cedel, 141 F.3d 39, 42-45
(2d Cir. 1998).
212. While the EEOC was created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 704, 78
continue to serve as a springboard for the continued internationalization of
American employment discrimination statutes.211  As a direct consequence, the
overseas operations of foreign enterprises may become subjected to the
investigative reach of the EEOC, and furthermore, these foreign enterprises
are likely to be reluctant to invest in America and to employ our workers here
at home—partly because the Second Circuit supplanted its will for that of
Congress.
Morelli’s internationalization of the ADEA not only subjects to possible
liability a larger subset of employing entities than Congress truly intended, but
this decision also provides the EEOC with a platform to extend its
investigative tentacles around a larger subset of small businesses otherwise
too small to be considered “employers” but for their foreign-controlled parent
enterprises and the foreign workers employed on foreign soil.  It is reasonable
to presume, for instance, that Morelli may actually allow the EEOC’s New
York District Office to issue administrative subpoenas to executives of a
European or Asian entity that owns or controls a small domestic subsidiary
and that a federal judge in the Southern District of New York will enforce
them.  Suddenly, the EEOC may become the world’s “equal employment
opportunity” enforcer, regardless of whether or not the world—or
Congress—wants it to be.
The EEOC, never in need of a reason to extend itself, will likely exploit
decisions like Morelli to further advance its self-expanding mission on to the
global stage despite the dearth of statutory authority to do so.212  With an
542 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:507
Stat. 258 (1964), the Commission was not originally empowered to enforce the law.  Rather, the EEOC was
limited to merely investigating claims of discrimination and seeking conciliation between the parties.  Id.
§ 706.  It was not until 1972 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§ 4(a), 86 Stat. 104 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2000)), that the EEOC was granted the
authority to enforce the anti-discrimination laws which had been passed in the previous decade.  During
this period in the EEOC’s history, between the grants of investigatory power and enforcement power, it was
often described as a “toothless tiger” by civil rights groups.  EEOC, THE STORY OF THE UNITED STATES
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPO RTU NITY COMM ISSION:  ENSURING THE PROMISE OF OPPORTUNITY FOR 35
YEARS 5 (2000) [hereinafter EEOC:  ENSURING THE PROMISE].
213. Trumpeting its self-proclaimed achievements through such matters as headline-grabbing
settlement amounts, the EEOC leaves the distinct impression that success can only be measured by cases
won and settlements obtained—the exact opposite of how rational people typically assess the successful
implementation of a remedial measure—that is, by determining whether the remedial measure has truly
caused a decrease in the frequency of the problem the remedial measure was designed to
remediate—invidious discrimination here.  Yet the EEOC’s self-promoting scorecard seems to suggest that
such invidious discrimination has gotten worse, not better, since 1964, despite a much more inclusive and
diverse American workforce today than in the infancy of the civil rights movement.
214. This type of inherent conflict is not new in the arena of federal law enforcement.  The late 1980s
and 1990s witnessed a massive campaign to overhaul the Internal Revenue Service and curb the abuses in
an agency empowered with concurrent authority to both investigate and prosecute the tax laws.  See Steven
Komarow, IRS Announces Punishments, Reprimands for Unruly Agents, USA TODAY, Sept. 15, 1998 at
5A (reporting IRS reprimanding dozens of employees and top managers to end “overzealous hounding of
taxpayers”); William E. Gibson, Passage of Bill to Reform IRS Sets Stage for Wider Tax; Debate, BUFFALO
NEWS (New York), July 10, 1998, at 5A (reporting overwhelming support for reform of IRS due to taxpayer
complaints); R. A. Zaldivar, IRS Chief:  Changes Will Take Time, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 2, 1998, at A2
(noting that even the head of the IRS was disturbed by the testimony of abuses); Albert B. Crenshaw, IRS
Oversight Plan Draws White House Fire, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1997, at A9 (discussing the debate over
how to reform the IRS).  As early as 1988, a Taxpayer Bill of Rights prohibited the IRS from instituting
production goals or quotas on its agents.  Omnibus Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 100-647, §6231,
102 Stat. 3730, 3734 (1988).  Nearly ten years later, oversight of the agency continued as Congress
mandated that the IRS annually submit a report detailing misconduct by agents during the preceding year.
Taxpayer Bill of Rights II, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1211, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996).
That is not to suggest that the EEOC’s zealousness rises to the level of the IRS agents who terrorized
tax-law transgressors.  See Robert Dodge, Commissioner Apologizes for Abuses at IRS; He Vows Immediate
Reforms, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 26, 1997, at 1A (reporting of a Senate hearing in which IRS
employees told of agents “tampering with jurors and witnesses, fabricating evidence and browsing through
agency records to learn secrets about former husbands, potential boyfriends and enemies”).  The EEOC’s
targets, discriminating businesses, are of course inherently less frail than the individual taxpayer, but
analogies are far from unreasonable.
215. In August 2002, the EEOC issued a press release announcing the completion of an “extensive
five-year litigation study” reporting that nearly 91% of all federal employment discrimination lawsuits
asserted by the EEOC are resolved in its favor—either through Consent Decrees, settlement agreements or
court orders.  Press Release, Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, EEOC Issues Comprehensive
Litigation Report (Aug. 13, 2002) (reporting success rate of 90.72%), available at http://www.eeoc.
gov/press/8-13-02.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2004) [hereinafter EEOC Litigation Report].  At trial and on
inherent need to validate its own existence,213 the EEOC has justified budget
requests—and its own existence—by touting its enforcement efforts,214 i.e.,
through its litigation statistics215 and the press release “bully pulpit.”216  These
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appeal, the EEOC’s success rates are 60.24% and 80% respectively.  Id.  These numbers dwarf the private
bar’s success rate of only 26.8% at trial and a meager 16% on appeal.  Id.
Remarkable as these numbers are, they are even more so when one considers that the EEOC has
achieved these results while increasing the number of suits they have brought.  In its 2002 annual release,
the EEOC reported that between 1997 and 2002, its active litigation cases rose by over 87%.  See U.S.
EEOC OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2002, Pt. II.A. (2002), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/litigation/02annrpt.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2004).  In 2002 alone, the EEOC’s Office
of General Counsel, the litigation arm of the EEOC, recovered over $26.6 million for persons who filed
federal discrimination claims.  EEOC Litigation Report, supra.  As Cari M. Dominguez, Chair of the
EEOC, announced, the EEOC “will not hesitate to utilize litigation when necessary and appropriate.”  Id.
Unanswered is the question of how the EEOC has managed to achieve these victories during a period where
critics suggest that the EEOC has been avoiding the largest defendants and the most political cases.  Reed
Abelson, Anti-Bias Agency is Short of Will and Cash, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2001, at 3-1 (“Although it does
manage to process the tens of thousands of complaints it receives each year, the agency seems passive . . . .
Its enforcement efforts often seem haphazard and uncoordinated, critics say, and it is noticeably absent in
many lawsuits accusing the nation’s most powerful companies . . . .”).  Prosecutorial discretion certainly
is one major factor, but to leave the matter at that minimizes the agency’s slow but inexorable mission creep
as an additional explanation.
216. See, e.g., EEOC Litigation Report, supra note 215 (describing results of EEOC litigation study).
Further leaving the impression that dollars equals victories as the EEOC’s own press releases posted on its
website where, between October 2002 and October 2003, the EEOC posted thirty-seven press releases with
titles containing settlement amounts or judgment awards ranging from $30,000 to $47 million.  U.S. EEOC,
EEOC Press Releases, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
217. EEOC OFFICE OF RESEARCH, INFORMATION AND PLANNING, BUDGET AND STAFFING (2002) (on
file with authors).
218. Id.
measures have not gone unrewarded as the EEOC received over $70 million
in budget increases from 1997-2002.217  With this nearly 30% increase over
a five-year period, the EEOC obtained a budget totaling over $310 million in
2002.218  The internationalization of American employment discrimination
laws will likely be too tempting for the EEOC to pass up.  If the EEOC does
indeed use Morelli to investigate foreign owned enterprises on foreign soil, it
will likely ruffle international feathers at a time when anti-U.S. sentiment
appears to be at an all-time high.  The legitimacy of the EEOC’s potential
jurisdictional reach into these murky international waters pushes, if not
exceeds, the bounds of its legitimate authority as currently established by
Congress.
Moreover, Morelli’s internationalization of American employment
discrimination statutes does not bode well for the U.S. economy.  Wary of
being scrutinized by the American regulatory community and of being
exposed to legal liability, foreign business enterprises are dissuaded from
investing in the United States in a way that would actually employ more
Americans.  For instance, remedies under the various employment
discrimination statutes include injunctive relief, back pay, front pay,
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219. See Greenbaum v. Svenska Handelsbanken, 26 F. Supp. 2d 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that
after Morelli v. Cedel, the foreign employees of the defendant should be counted to determine the punitive
damages cap under Title VII).  The Greenbaum court subsequently found that the previous punitive damage
award of $50,000, which had been based on number of employees the defendant had in the United States,
should be increased to $300,000 reflecting the total number of employees defendant had world-wide.  Id.
at 655.
220. Ned G. Howenstine, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States:  New Investment in 2000,
SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, June 2001, at 27, available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/ARTICLES/
2001/06June/0601newi.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2004).
221. Id.
222. Id.
compensatory damages and punitive damages; and post-Morelli, the number
of employees employed overseas by a foreign parent enterprise can affect the
amount of liability to which such businesses, both foreign and domestic, are
exposed.219
Concern for such uncertain legal exposure unquestionably impacts a
foreign firm’s willingness to invest in U.S. enterprises in a manner that would
result in domestic job creation.  Between 1997 and 2000, direct foreign
investment in the United States increased from $70 billion to $320 billion.220
That rapid increase in investment dollars was, however, almost exclusively a
result of foreign acquisition of U.S. businesses, as opposed to establishment
of new businesses in the United States.221  According to Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) figures, while the foreign acquisition of U.S. businesses
increased from $60 billion to $316 billion over the four year period from 1997
to 2000, foreign investment to establish new domestic businesses actually
decreased from nearly $9 billion to $4.3 billion.222  While the actual cause of
this drop may never be known, the decrease does coincide with the Second
Circuit’s ruling in Morelli.  Accordingly, Morelli could very likely have a
deleterious effect on foreign investment in the American economy and may
actually preclude the creation of new employment opportunities for Americans
of every race, sex, age, etc.—that is, equal unemployment opportunities.
Given the constitutional, economic, and geopolitical implications
involved, the decision to internationalize American employment
discrimination statutes is certainly one better left to Congress.
